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THE COSTS OF LIQUIDITY ENHANCEMENT: 
TRANSPARENCY COST, RISK ALTERATION, 
AND COORDINATION PROBLEMS 
Edward J. Janger* 
Markets breathe liquidity like fire breathes oxygen. In the 1980s, when 
I was in law school, Richard Helmholz would describe the history of 
property law as a long, gradual, but largely successful assault on alienation 
restrictions. Helmholz’s statement was an exaggeration. Inalienability rules 
still exist, notwithstanding the University of Chicago Law School’s attempt 
to abolish them. 1  Nonetheless, his statement reflects a widespread 
understanding about business law. Commercial law should facilitate the 
movement of property in commerce.2 At least as an initial matter, there is 
no reason to except bankruptcy law from this general proposition, and 
current bankruptcy law does not prohibit or even regulate (in any systematic 
way) the trading of claims against the debtor while the case is pending.3 
Liquidity enhancement through negotiability is a key device for 
facilitating the trading of debt. Douglas Baird (again back in the 1980s), in 
his course on commercial paper, referred, over and over again, to the 
“holder in due course”4 as being “the most exalted status in all of Anglo-
American law.” 5  In this regard, the holder-in-due course doctrine for 
negotiable instruments is one of a species of purchaser protections that exist 
throughout commercial law—other examples include the buyer in the 
ordinary course of business6 and the good faith purchaser7—that allow a 
seller, even a wrongful one, to transfer better title to a purchaser than they 
have themselves.8 The purpose is to enhance the liquidity of, and hence 
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 1. For a discussion of inalienability rules in property law, see Susan Rose Ackerman, 
Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985). 
 2. Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970, 971 (1985) (“As a 
first approximation it appears that any restraint upon the power of an owner to alienate his own 
property should be regarded as impermissible.”). 
 3. Indeed, in 1991, Rule 3001(e) was amended to eliminate the role of bankruptcy courts in 
determining whether a transfer of a claim was “unconditional” (a sale) or “conditional” (a security 
interest). FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(e), advisory committee’s note (“Subdivision (e) is amended to 
limit the court’s role to the adjudication of disputes regarding the transfers of claims.”). 
 4. U.C.C. § 3-302 (2002). 
 5. See Albert J. Rosenthal, Negotiability—Who Needs it?, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 377 
(1971); see also Miller v. Race, (1978) 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B.). 
 6. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (2001); U.C.C. § 9-320 (2008). 
 7. U.C.C. § 2-403 (2003). 
 8. See discussion infra Part II. 
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create a market for, a particular type of asset.9 Often overlooked, however, 
when such liquidity enhancing doctrines are created, is that, historically, 
there has been a quid pro quo for the protection (good faith); these doctrines 
have been created sparingly; and they are narrowly tailored to facilitate 
particular types of transactions. These limitations exist because liquidity 
enhancement has costs, both to the transacting parties, and, seemingly 
paradoxically, to the market itself. 
As modern techniques for enhancing liquidity have developed, this 
insight has been ignored. Little attention has been paid to these costs, either 
before or after a debtor files for bankruptcy. This Article takes a skeptical 
look at liquidity enhancement, seeking to catalogue the direct (transactional) 
and indirect (social) costs of enhancing liquidity, and then questioning 
certain assumptions about the justification for facilitating the post-petition 
trading of claims in bankruptcy. In Part I, I will describe the traditional 
doctrines used to enhance the liquidity of otherwise illiquid assets, and 
detail the modern transactional devices that are used to similar effect on 
new categories of assets, regardless of whether the traditional prerequisites 
for liquidity enhancement are met. In Part II, I will catalogue the various 
transparency, and other costs, associated with liquidity enhancement 
generally, and the novel liquidity enhancement devices in particular. Part III 
will describe a number of contexts in bankruptcy where courts have been 
faced with a tension between liquidity enhancement and bankruptcy 
policies. In most of these cases, liquidity policies have won out over 
bankruptcy policies. I will conclude by arguing that the debate about post-
bankruptcy claims trading operates from the wrong baseline. Regulation of 
claims trading is generally treated as liquidity harming, but actually, 
allowing any claims trading post-bankruptcy should be viewed as a 
liquidity enhancement doctrine, and its desirability as policy should be 
weighed against its effects on reorganization policy. In my view, 
bankruptcy policy and the market will be better served by close attention to 
the traditional limits on liquidity enhancement than by a mindless solicitude 
for debt markets. 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Miller, 97 Eng. Rep. at 401. Lord Mansfield is quite clear on this point, basing the holder 
in due course doctrine on the fact that bank notes function as money substitutes: 
Now they are not goods, not securities, nor documents for debts, nor are so 
esteemed: but are treated as money, as cash, in the ordinary course and 
transaction of business, by the general consent of mankind; which gives them 
the credit and currency of money, to all intents and purposes. They are as 
much money, as guineas themselves are; or any other current coin, that is 
used in common payments, as money or cash. 
Id. 
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I. LIQUIDITY ENHANCEMENT 
A. OLD SCHOOL – THE HOLDER IN DUE COURSE AND THE GOOD 
FAITH PURCHASER 
The law of personal property sales and the law of negotiable 
instruments each take markets seriously. Each body of law is designed to 
facilitate the transfer of ownership. Sales law facilitates the flow of goods in 
commerce.10 The law of negotiable instruments facilitates the movement 
through the financial system of paperized debt obligations.11 In each case, to 
receive purchaser protection, the transaction must fall into a category where 
enhanced liquidity is necessary for a trading pattern to function, and in 
addition, the purchaser must be innocent of any knowledge that he is 
purchasing from a thief or notice of defenses on the underlying 
transaction.12 The scope of the legal subsidy is limited, and the law takes 
steps to minimize secondary costs. 
One classic example of liquidity enhancement is the doctrine of 
entrustment under UCC § 2-403. 13  Under that section, a person who 
entrusts goods to someone who is a seller of goods of the kind gives that 
seller the power, though not the right, to transfer good title to a person who 
is a buyer in the ordinary course of business.14 The logic here is that goods 
markets will not function properly if every time someone walks into a 
jewelry store or antique dealer, they have to establish that their seller has 
clear title to the goods.15 Under § 2-403, it is enough that the purchaser 
walks into the jewelry store and purchases a watch out of the display case to 
give them good title. 16  This is true even if the jeweler was only in 
possession of the watch because the original owner had brought it in for a 
repair.17 
A second classic example of liquidity enhancement is the holder in due 
course doctrine. 18  To become a holder in due course, one must have 
purchased a negotiable instrument19  in good faith,20  for value,21  without 
notice of any defenses to enforcement of the instrument,22 and the purchaser 
must have taken possession through a valid negotiation.23 If one satisfies 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See generally, U.C.C. art. 2 (2003). 
 11. See generally, U.C.C. arts. 3–4 (2002). 
 12. U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (2001). 
 13. U.C.C. § 2-403 (2003). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. cmt 1–4. 
 16. § 2-403. 
 17. Id. 
 18. U.C.C. § 3-302 (2002). 
 19. U.C.C. § 3-104 (2002). 
 20. U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (2001). 
 21. U.C.C. § 3-303 (2002). 
 22. U.C.C. § 3-302(2) (2002). 
 23. U.C.C. § 3-301 (2002). 
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these requirements the effect is powerful and surprising. A negotiable 
instrument is nothing more than a paperized debt obligation. The 
maker/issuer of a promissory note promises to pay the note according to its 
terms to a person entitled to enforce the note.24 The drawer/issuer of a check 
or draft instructs a third party to make payment on the instrument, and 
promises to pay the item according to its terms if it is dishonored.25 Up to 
this point, negotiable instrument law has merely made contractual 
obligations assignable. It has not altered the content of those rights. The 
holder of the instrument has no greater rights than the original payee or 
their transferor. The holder in due course doctrine, however, goes further. It 
gives a person who purchases the instrument for value and without notice of 
any competing claims against the instrument, or defenses on the underlying 
obligation, the right to enforce the note regardless of whether the obligor 
had valid defenses that could have been asserted against the original 
payee.26 Moreover, the holder in due course “owns” the instrument free of 
any claims from competing owners. 27 
In both of these cases, the class of transactions subject to liquidity 
enhancement is limited, and the procedures are well established.28 There are 
a number of reasons for these formal limitations. The first is the need to 
ensure that the transaction falls into the category of transactions where 
liquidity enhancement is beneficial.29 The second is based in notice (both to 
the issuer and to third parties). Liquidity enhancement often has the effect 
of defeating the reasonable expectations of at least one of the parties to the 
transaction and may confer a windfall on another.30 The maker/issuer of a 
negotiable promissory note may be surprised to find out that even if he or 
she has a valid defense on the transaction, she must pay a holder in due 
course on the note. Similarly, the owner of the watch described above may 
find it hard to believe that the watch cannot be recovered after it has been 
purchased by a buyer in the ordinary course of business. 
In each of these examples, the marketability of an asset is enhanced 
through a legally created doctrine that enhances the value of the transferred 
asset. In both cases, liquidity is enhanced by freeing the asset from the 
property claims of competing owners. In the case of a negotiable instrument, 
liquidity is further enhanced by depriving the obligor of any defenses it 
might have to enforcement. These remarkable doctrines of freedom from 
                                                                                                                 
 24. U.C.C. § 3-412 (2002). 
 25. U.C.C. § 3-414 (2002). 
 26. U.C.C. § 3-305(a), (b) (2002). 
 27. § 3-305. 
 28. U.C.C. § 2-403 (2003) (entrustment doctrine); U.C.C. § 3-302 (2002) (holder in due course 
doctrine). 
 29. See supra text accompanying note 9. 
 30. Official Comment 2 to 3-104 explains that preventing surprise due to freedom from 
defenses is one of the reasons that “words of negotiability” are a requirement for the applicability 
of Article 3, and hence of the holder in due course doctrine. U.C.C. § 3-104 cmt. 2 (2002). 
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claims and freedom from defenses advantage the buyers and sellers of 
goods and negotiable instruments over the owners of goods and the issuers 
of negotiable instruments. 
B. NEW SCHOOL – STRUCTURED FINANCE 
Negotiability and good faith purchaser protections evolved in an era of 
limited liquidity and costly, imperfect communication.31  Modern capital 
markets and financial institutions, blessed with electronic communications, 
rating agencies, and credit scores, have become much more comfortable 
trading debt. One of the hallmarks of the new economy is the creation of 
new types of financial instruments that trade freely. Another aspect is the 
extent to which financial obligations are sliced, diced, repackaged, and 
repriced through the use of pooling, tranching, and hedging. 32  Loan 
participations allow multiple institutions to share exposure to a single credit. 
Securitization has made it possible for interests in assets to be pooled and 
then repackaged as securities representing an interest in the pool. 33 
Resecuritization of debt into collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) can 
take very risky underlying obligations and sell portions of them as 
ostensibly low risk debt instruments. 
These new trading structures require liquidity enhancement as well, but 
the liquidity enhancements are not as obvious or understandable as the old 
style good faith purchaser protections, though they often accomplish—by 
design, and sometimes, by subterfuge—the same thing. For example, 
securitization deals are often said to require “asset isolation.”34 The concept 
here is that the securitized assets must be divorced from any claims against 
the originator. The securitization structure must be “bankruptcy remote.”35 
Just like good faith purchaser protection, the securitized assets must be 
isolated from other potential claims.36 In addition, in order to trade freely, 
some securitized obligations need to achieve a certain minimum credit 
rating.37 In order to accomplish this, credit enhancements such as bond 
insurance or credit default swaps are built into the securitization structure,38 
                                                                                                                 
 31. See, e.g., JAMES STEVEN ROGERS, THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND 
NOTES 32–43 (J.H. Baker ed., 1995). 
 32. MARCIA STIGUM & ANTHONY CRESCENZI, STIGUM’S MONEY MARKET (4th ed. 2007). 
 33. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 
145–46 (1994). 
 34. See id. at 135 (explaining the use of special purpose vehicles “to separate the receivables 
from risks associated with the originator”). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 135–36. 
 37. Id. at 136–37 (discussing the impact of debt securities ratings on investor behavior). 
 38. The role of AIG in issuing bond insurance and credit default swaps is now well understood. 
See Adam Davidson, How AIG Fell Apart, REUTERS, Sept. 18, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/newsOne/idUSMAR85972720080918?sp=true. One of the reasons that the Federal Reserve 
felt that it could not let AIG fail was that the evaporation of the credit default insurance policy 
would have constituted a default on many thousands of securitization facilities and would have 
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or tranching is used to give certain securities a distributional preference 
over others.39 Like the “freedom from defenses” that accompanies a holder 
in due course, these credit enhancements free the purchaser of the asset 
from the need to worry about the soundness of the underlying obligation. 
At least in the first instance, these financial products are creatures of 
contract, transferring or parceling out the ownership of a single claim or a 
pool of claims. The liquidity of large claims is enhanced by the ability to 
spread the risk among various investors, while the liquidity of small claims 
is enhanced by both the ability to spread risk among investors and the 
ability to pool the risk of various loans. 
But, as it turns out, contract law is not enough. There is hydraulic 
pressure behind liquidity logic that has cascaded toward legal liquidity 
enhancement by fait accompli. Essential to the marketing of these 
repackaged interests in debt is the ability to obtain a legal opinion stating 
that the pooled assets are free from any claims that might be asserted by 
creditors of the issuer. As has been widely noted, certainty that the assets 
have been subject to a true sale has been hard to come by.40 Indeed, the 
centrality of freedom from claims, and the need for credit enhancement, can 
be seen in legislative pressure exerted by the industry to pass statutes that 
would insulate securitizations, heavy with credit enhancement through 
recourse, from being recharacterized as loans under the doctrine of true 
sale.41 First, efforts were made to place a securitization safe harbor into the 
then pending bankruptcy reform bill. When that failed, more successful 
efforts resulted in the Asset Backed Securities Facilitation Act passed in 
Delaware, and similar statutes passed in several other jurisdictions.42 
C. NEW SCHOOL – CLAIMS TRADING AND CREDIT DERIVATIVES 
Even without the benefit of securitization, or negotiability enhancement, 
claims against debtors in bankruptcy now trade freely. There are now 
money managers and hedge funds that focus on investing in distressed 
                                                                                                                 
triggered an even worse credit collapse. See Kevin G. Hall, AIG Bailout: Questions and Answers, 
MCCLATCHY-TRIB. NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 18, 2008, available at http://www.catholic.org/ 
national/national_story.php?id=29443. 
 39. Andreas A. Jobst, A Primer on Structured Finance, 13 J. OF DERIVATIVES & HEDGE 
FUNDS 199, 205 (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=832184. 
 40. See, e.g., Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of 
Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553 (2008). 
 41. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2701A–2703A (2003); see also ALA. CODE § 35-10A-
2(a)(1) (2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9–10:9(e) (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-425-26 (2004); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1109.75 (West 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-1-10 (2003); TEX. BUS. 
& COM. CODE ANN. § 9.109(e) (Vernon 2001). 
 42. Edward J. Janger, The Death of Secured Lending, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1759 (2004) 
[hereinafter Janger, The Death of Secured Lending]; Edward J. Janger, Muddy Rules for 
Securitization Transactions, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. 301 (2002) [hereinafter Janger, Muddy 
Rules]; see also sources cited supra note 41. 
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debt.43 Some are merely seeking arbitrage, buying up trade claims at a 
discount. Others are engaged in more complicated strategies, perhaps 
hoping to play a role in plan negotiations, or even obtaining control of the 
reorganized debtor.44 But again, once these new types of debt markets have 
developed, pressures have emerged for negotiability-like protections. One 
form of liquidity enhancement, again, is a product of contract. Credit 
default swaps have allowed claims traders to leverage or hedge the risk 
attributes of their investments, depending on their assessment of the 
debtor.45 
However, the same hydraulic pressure for legally protected liquidity 
enhancement exists here as well. As discussed below, those interested in 
enhancing the market for bankruptcy claims have argued forcefully against 
any bankruptcy court rulings that might threaten the liquidity of their claims, 
either by subjecting the claims to defenses, undercutting asset isolation, or 
requiring disclosure of a claim holder’s economic position.46 In short, even 
here, free alienability is not enough. Once a market for claims is created, the 
market itself generates pressure for liquidity enhancement. 
Each of these types of liquidity has benefits, but liquidity itself, and 
liquidity enhancement even more so, come at some cost. It is with this 
question in mind that in the next section I will seek to catalogue the risks 
associated with extending liquidity enhancing protections to new 
transactions. My focus is on the costs, but I remain cognizant of the benefits 
associated with making debt more liquid. 
II. THE COSTS OF LIQUIDITY ENHANCEMENT 
In order to understand the costs of liquidity enhancement, it is 
necessary to understand the basic principles associated with creating liquid 
assets. Two hallmarks of liquid assets are (1) transferability and (2) readily 
ascertainable value. The paradigmatic liquid asset is the dollar bill. 
Ownership can be transferred simply by transferring possession. Value is 
ascertainable on the face of the instrument. 
The attributes of liquidity are shared by a broad variety of assets; the 
same can be said of a Snickers bar, a mobile home, and broccoli. Title can 
be transferred in a straightforward and well understood fashion, and the 
purchaser can tell, by examining the item itself, how much he or she is 
willing to pay. The point is a bit less obvious when talking about negotiable 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Stuart C. Gilson, Investing in Distressed Situations: A Market Survey, FIN. ANALYSTS J., 
Nov.–Dec. 1995, at 8, 8. 
 44. For an example, see Louise Story, Investors Stalk the Wounded of Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 4, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/04/business/04vultures. 
html?_r=1. 
 45. See Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Resolution of Financial Distress, in 
CREDIT DERIVATIVES HANDBOOK: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES, INNOVATIONS, AND MARKET 
DRIVERS 47, 49–52 (Greg N. Gregoriou & Paul Ali eds., 2008) (explaining credit default swaps). 
 46. See discussion infra Part III. 
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instruments, but a promissory note or a check can be transferred in 
commerce just like a dollar bill. In both cases, however, liquidity 
enhancement through good faith purchaser protection serves an important 
purpose. The purchaser knows that he or she has good title and with the 
holder in due course doctrine, the purchaser of a debt obligation also knows 
that they purchase the item free of any defenses that the obligor might be 
able to assert on the underlying obligation. Therefore, the purchaser need 
only worry about the creditworthiness of the obligor, not the rhyme or 
reason underlying the promise to pay. 
The core doctrines of liquidity enhancement, freedom from claims and 
freedom from defenses, seek to enhance the value of a transferred asset by 
making title more certain and value more transparent. The results are 
sometimes shocking. A thief can transfer good title and an obligor may be 
forced to pay for goods and services that were never delivered or, in certain 
instances, which have already been paid for. As a consequence, these 
doctrines that facilitate negotiability have second order effects that are often 
overlooked. 
The first set of costs of liquidity enhancement run to their effects on the 
issuer of an instrument. 
A. TRANSPARENCY OF THE ISSUER/ORIGINATOR/SELLER 
One effect of liquidity enhancement is that it may undercut the 
transparency of the issuer. Two examples illustrate this effect, one old 
school, the other new school: 
• First, the holder in due course doctrine itself makes the affairs 
of an instrument’s originator less obvious. Imagine a debtor 
who has entered into a contract to purchase a widget. Imagine 
that the widget cost $100,000, and the purchaser bought on 
credit, by issuing a negotiable promissory note. Immediately 
after the transaction closed, the seller sold the promissory note 
to a holder in due course. The next day the widget 
malfunctioned and proved to be worthless. As between the 
buyer and the seller, the buyer could have repudiated the 
transaction and paid nothing. Even if the seller were insolvent, 
the buyer would have recourse through recoupment. However, 
where the seller has financed the transaction with a negotiable 
promissory note, he or she may still be liable for the full 
purchase price to a purchaser of the negotiable promissory note. 
This is a simple version of the transparency cost associated 
with liquidity enhancement. Investors in a firm may not be able 
to properly value the contingent liability associated with having 
issued negotiable instruments. While cash transactions similarly 
leave the buyer with only an action against the seller, 
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negotiable instruments accomplish this in a less obvious and 
less transparent way. 
• Second, the further one moves from the core functions of 
negotiability, the greater these transparency costs become. 
While freedom from defenses on a check may be tolerably well 
understood, Enron provides an extreme example of the 
transparency costs of modern structured finance transactions.47 
When Enron used structured finance transactions to raise 
capital, it made various warranties as to the value of assets 
transferred to a securitization pool.48 Such warranties are not 
particularly unusual. But the contingent liabilities they create 
may be (and in the case of Enron were) difficult to value and 
may not be (and in the case of Enron were not) apparent on a 
company’s balance sheet. Enron was a radical illustration of 
this effect, and its failure to disclose the full extent of its 
liabilities rose to the level of fraud. 49  Nonetheless, this 
transparency reducing effect is present to a lesser degree in 
many entities with securitized assets. 
B. RISK ALTERATION 
Many firms choose to enhance the liquidity of their debt obligations by 
issuing asset backed securities, rather than borrowing against their assets.50 
The classic example is receivables-based financing. A company that 
chooses to securitize its receivables, instead of borrowing against them, 
may receive a lower interest rate, but will also significantly reduce the 
likelihood that it will be able to reorganize should it fall upon hard times. 
Encumbered assets (including cash collateral) may be used by the debtor 
during the reorganization. Securitized assets, it is argued, may not.51 Thus, 
the securitization of assets may harm the creditors of the originator by 
making their investment more risky than would a secured loan. This 
shifting of risk from one class of creditors to another is present any time a 
debtor offers one class of creditors a distribution preference over another. 
One response to this is that the remaining creditors can adjust their interest 
rates or prices to reflect this enhanced risk. But, as has been explored at 
length elsewhere, both secured credit and securitization allow the debtor 
and the secured lender or asset-backed securities (ABS) purchaser to 
externalize risk at the expense of nonconsensual and certain nonadjusting 
                                                                                                                 
 47. BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE 
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 151, 155–57 (2003). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Janger, Muddy Rules, supra note 42. 
 51. See In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001). 
48 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 4 
creditors.52 To the extent that ABS purchasers receive even better treatment 
in bankruptcy than secured lenders, the externality associated with risk 
alteration is even more problematic. In this context, the exigencies of 
liquidity enhancement (freedom from claims) run smack into the 
bankruptcy policy of allowing debtors to use encumbered assets during  
reorganization.53 This, in turn, increases the risk faced by those employees, 
tort claimants, and other unsecured creditors who might benefit from a 
going concern reorganization. 
C. DISTORTION OF MONITORING INCENTIVES 
It is axiomatic that asset based lending causes creditors to focus their 
attention on monitoring the assets of a debtor instead of the debtor itself. 
This has been described as one of the beneficial effects of secured credit.54 
Lenders with particular monitoring advantages divide up the monitoring 
effort efficiently. 55  Some lenders might monitor receivables, others 
inventory, and yet others equipment, or real estate.56 However, asset backed 
securitization takes this balkanization of the debtor to a new level in the 
interest of liquidity. Liquidity enhancement through asset isolation can 
distort monitoring incentives in two distinct ways: It can create conflicts of 
interest and it can render monitoring infeasible. 
1. Conflict of Interest 
Securitizations generally require assurance that the securitized assets 
have been legally separated from the bankruptcy risks of the debtor. This is 
done not for the purpose of creating a monitoring efficiency, but to relieve 
the asset purchasers of monitoring costs.57 For example, in a securitization, 
bond insurance may divorce the credit risk of the instrument from the 
underlying asset. Worse yet, as some of the previous panelists suggested, 
the use of credit default swaps and other derivatives may make it possible 
                                                                                                                 
 52. See Janger, The Death of Secured Lending, supra note 42; Janger, Muddy Rules, supra 
note 42; see also Lynn M. LoPucki, The Essential Structure of Judgment Proofing, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 147 (1998). Note, some creditors who cannot adjust their interest rate after entering into a 
credit relationship can factor this into their price. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The 
Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 880–92 (1996). 
Suppliers and fixed rate lenders fall into this category. See id. Other non-adjusting creditors are 
not so lucky. Employees, for example, generally do not factor their employer’s creditworthiness, 
or future creditworthiness, into their wage demands. Id. at 884. 
 53. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2006). 
 54. Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901 
(1986). 
 55. Id. at 932. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See generally STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE 
PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION (Adam D. Ford ed., 3rd ed. 2002). 
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for investors to hedge out all of their risk, or even “short” the debtor.58 Thus, 
the capital markets investors may not care about monitoring the underlying 
investment or, if they do, they may not care in a way that is efficiency 
enhancing. The importance of this conflict of interest is brought out more 
starkly in bankruptcy, where debt claims carry with them governance rights. 
2. Infeasibility – Transparency of the Investment 
At a certain point, however, these liquidity enhancements can go off the 
deep end. Resecuritization of a debt obligation into a CDO may make it 
impossible to discern the nature of the original asset. The structure of many 
mortgage backed securities is such that some of the assets held by the 
securitization vehicle may be derived from a pool of mortgages, but other 
assets may be buckets of other mortgage backed and/or synthetic securities, 
created through the matching of various swaps.59 When this is the case, 
none of the actual investors in a mortgage backed security, for example, 
will be in a position to monitor either the underlying assets or the servicer 
who is charged with maximizing the asset’s value. Instead, the sole 
monitoring responsibility will fall to the originator, who in the case of a 
structured finance vehicle will be the “debtor/originator,” and in the case of 
mortgage backed securities, will likely be the “mortgage 
broker/originator.”60 In either case, the originator/servicer’s incentives may 
be quite different from those of the investors. For instance, in the case of 
mortgage backed securities, the originator/servicer may not have a real 
economic interest in the mortgage pool but may stand to make more money 
charging fees for foreclosing on the asset than by restructuring.61 In the case 
of a structured finance vehicle, the investors may be subject to the same 
agency problems as appear in the context of public equity securities. 62 
Disbursed ownership leaves individual owners of shares with little incentive 
to monitor. Similarly, disbursed ownership of an investment vehicle may 
lead to suboptimal monitoring. 
D. AGENCY COSTS – “EMPTY VOTING” IN BANKRUPTCY 
As noted above, the credit enhancement conferred legally by freedom 
from claims and freedom from defenses, and conferred contractually 
through credit default swaps and other credit enhancements, may distort 
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monitoring incentives. But, the problem runs deeper than that in bankruptcy. 
In a reorganization case, debt claimants have governance rights.63 During 
the case, they have the power to object to non-ordinary course borrowing 
decisions, to non-ordinary course asset sales, to seek dismissal or 
conversion, and, more importantly, to vote on the plan of reorganization.64 
When the holder of governance rights has a conflict of interest, the result is 
a principal/agent problem. 
When a claim is repackaged and enhanced through the use of a credit 
default swap or other hedge, the voting rights may be divorced from the 
economic interest associated with the claim. In nonbankruptcy securities 
markets, derivatives trading may lead to the so-called “empty voting” 
problem, where a single investor may hold both an equity (stock) interest in 
a company and a short position against the same company.65 This hedge 
reduces the shareholder’s economic stake in the company. To make matters 
worse, the same shareholder may decide to “go short” by purchasing a 
greater amount of “insurance” than they hold stock. If they do this, the 
shareholder may actually benefit from a drop in the company’s shares value. 
They may, therefore, vote their shares against the company’s interest.66 
This same “empty voting” problem now occurs in bankruptcy with debt 
claims. Holders of one class of debt may not share the same economic 
interest as other members of that class because they have hedged their claim. 
Thus, even these contractual liquidity enhancements can have considerable 
costs. 
E. ANTICOMMONS PROBLEMS 
Liquidity enhancement allows debtors to carve their debt obligations up 
into smaller and smaller chunks. It also allows creditors who may have a 
large exposure to a particular debtor to spread their risk to multiple 
investors. While liquidity may reduce the cost of capital, it can considerably 
increase the costs of constructing a consensual restructuring of the debtor’s 
obligations. A debtor with one creditor may be able to negotiate a sensible 
restructuring, whereas a debtor with multiple creditors may be faced with 
coordination and holdout problems that lead to inefficient liquidation. 
While this is the classic justification for a reorganization statute, it was not 
fully appreciated until recently that carving up the capital structure of a 
debtor into small pieces through the use of structured finance and 
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derivatives might create these problems as well.67 Worse yet, as discussed 
in Part III, this fragmentation, along with post-bankruptcy claims trading, 
may undercut the ability of debtors to cobble together a confirmable plan of 
reorganization. 
F. ENDOGENEITY 
A key assumption in the issuance of ABS is that the purchaser need 
only look to the credit attributes of the purchased assets and not to the 
creditworthiness of the originator.68 A further assumption here is that the 
securitization of assets will not affect the value of the assets themselves, 
other than to make them more efficient forms of collateral.69 This same 
assumption is true of claims trading generally: the creation of a market for 
claims will not have a negative impact on the obligor. This assumption has 
proven false in a number of contexts. The “empty voting” problem 
described above is one example.70 Another current example, that applies to 
other forms of securitization as well, is that the slicing and dicing of 
investor interests in the underlying assets may affect the value of the assets 
themselves in two distinct ways. The anticommons problems, mentioned 
above, may make it harder to maximize the value of those assets, should 
there be a default on the underlying obligation.71 One aspect of the current 
foreclosure crisis is that mortgages have become harder to restructure 
because the servicer of the mortgages cannot, as a practical matter, obtain 
consent to the restructuring from all of the investors with an interest in the 
mortgage.72 As a result, foreclosures may be happening in instances where 
the way to maximize the value of a mortgage might be to restructure. 
Mortgages are just one particularly salient example of how too much 
liquidity may actually impair the value of assets. 
But even these examples may be too narrowly focused because they 
focus only on the particular assets and the particular debtor/originator. The 
negative effects of too much liquidity enhancement can affect the risk 
attributes of the broader market as well. Liquidity enhancement is not 
always market perfecting. This second aspect of liquidity enhancement has 
been remarked on in connection with the current mortgage meltdown. To 
the extent that a pool of assets is tied to one market, the development of a 
new financing device can affect the value of the assets themselves. As 
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money poured into U.S. mortgage markets, it had an inflationary effect on 
the value of homes. 73  These home values then formed the basis of 
mortgages underwritten in the prime market as well.74 As a result, problems 
in the subprime market exposed even prime mortgages to risk associated 
with deflation of the housing bubble. 
Each of the “costs” of liquidity enhancement described above can be 
expected to have market wide effects in varying degrees. The insight here, 
though, is that these effects may not always be positive. Liquidity is value 
creating. However, liquidity enhancement is, at bottom, distributive. We are 
willing to harm originators, issuers, debtors, and creditors of debtors at the 
behest of purchasers in the interest of the benefits of liquidity. Therefore, 
the question of “optimizing” the amount of liquidity enhancement is not a 
simple exercise. 
G. CONCLUSIONS – THE “NUMERUS CLAUSES,” THIRD PARTIES, AND 
THE ABSENCE OF VERIFICATION INSTITUTIONS 
It should be noted that some of the costs associated with liquidity 
enhancement are imposed on the debtor and other creditors. Transparency 
and risk alteration fall into this category. In both of these cases, the owners 
of the debtor, and the owners of the liquidity enhanced investment benefit 
from liquidity enhancement at the expense of the debtor’s other creditors. 
Other costs of liquidity enhancement actually undercut the value of the 
liquidity enhanced investment itself. Most of the costs described above fall 
into this category. Agency, anticommons, and endogeneity costs are all 
exacerbated by the very institutions that are used to enhance liquidity. It is 
this tradeoff that is generally unrecognized and that has led to many of the 
difficulties in the current economic downturn. 
To put it a different way, the costs of liquidity are all “third party” costs, 
but the two families of costs impose harm on two distinct sets of third 
parties. Transparency and risk alteration allow the debtor and liquidity 
enhanced creditors to externalize costs to the debtor’s creditors. Agency, 
anticommons, and endogeneity allow the debtor to impose costs on capital 
markets investors themselves. This last set of costs is well understood by 
property theorists but not by market participants or policy makers. Creating 
new and complex forms of property has costs. Civil law countries recognize 
this through the “numerus clauses” – an affirmative limit on the number of 
forms that property interests may take.75 Henry Smith and Thomas Merrill 
have argued forcefully that creation of novel forms of property can have 
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considerable third party costs because of the inability of third parties to 
understand the attributes of the ownership interest.76 Henry Hansmann and 
Reinier Kraakman have responded to Smith and Merrill by arguing that the 
content of a property right need not be regulated, so long as an institution 
exists that enables third parties to verify who controls the various incidents 
of ownership. 77  But even they would balk at securitization, credit 
derivatives, and free-for-all claims trading.78 These ownership transactions 
all serve to obscure the nature and location of ownership in ways that, even 
the most ardent fans of free alienability should concede, justify regulation. 
Again, it is this last set of costs that has been underappreciated in the 
ongoing policy debates. 
III. WHEN LIQUIDITY AND REORGANIZATION POLICY 
COLLIDE 
Notwithstanding these costs, the rhetoric of bankruptcy claims trading 
has treated liquidity as an unalloyed good, worthy of protection and 
enhancement. Bankruptcy claims trading, it is argued, facilitates 
restructuring, because claims purchasers who purchase claims at a discount 
may be more willing to accept a reduced distribution under the plan. 
Specialized investors may be able to realize value where others might not. 
Allowing claims trading after bankruptcy will increase the liquidity of a 
distressed debtor prior to bankruptcy because traders know that they will 
still be able to sell the debt after bankruptcy. These are all valid points. But, 
in a number of cases where a conflict has arisen between bankruptcy 
policies and liquidity enhancement, liquidity has won. 
A. RULE 2019 
A first example lies in the recent set of attacks on Federal Rule of 
Bankruptcy Procedure 2019.79 Rule 2019 requires members of unofficial or 
ad hoc committees to disclose their holdings in the debtor.80  As Judge 
Gropper pointed out in the Northwest case, this is a disclosure rule. 81 
Because other creditors or interest holders may seek to free ride on the 
efforts of the Committee when deciding whether to support or oppose a 
plan of reorganization, Committee members are required to disclose their 
economic positions.82 This is not an accident. Indeed, it is part of the logic 
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behind committees. Committee support of the plan of reorganization, it is 
hoped, will signal to the key constituencies that the plan is a good deal for 
similarly situated creditors. 
This function is undercut when claimants who are not members of the 
Committee cannot discern the economic position of the members. However, 
it is quite possible that a member of an official or ad hoc committee may 
have purchased a claim at a discount or even hedged out the risk associated 
with its investment. Paradoxically, the holder of a claim may even reverse 
its economic position through the use of hedging and other strategies, such 
that it might benefit from the debtor’s failure to reorganize. Distressed debt 
investors, perhaps for this very reason, have objected vociferously to being 
forced to make this disclosure.83 They have argued that to do so will either 
shut down claims trading or force traders to avoid becoming members of a 
committee.84 Two courts have been convinced by this argument.85 A Texas 
court in In re Scotia Development, L.L.C. held that the disruption to the 
bond market would be too great to require committee members to comply 
with Rule 2019.86 By contrast, in In re Kaiser Aluminum, a Delaware case, 
committee members were required to disclose their positions but were 
allowed to do so under seal.87 Finally, and uniquely, Judge Gropper, in the 
Northwest case required the committee members to actually disclose their 
positions.88 The result was a firestorm, calling for repeal or amendment of 
the rule or reversal of the opinion.89 
The arguments against the application of Rule 2019 were various, but 
the theme was that if claims traders were required to disclose their positions, 
they would not be able to pursue their investment strategies, causing a 
reduction in the value of claims both inside and outside of bankruptcy.90 
Judge Gropper responded that, while this might be true, he was bound by 
the text of the rule.91 More importantly though, he pointed out that in a 
bankruptcy case investors rely on committees to help them determine 
whether supporting a plan is in their best interests.92 Toward this end, they 
may rely on the position taken by a creditor who they believe is similarly 
situated.93 Where a creditor has hedged their position or bought debt of a 
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different type, and not disclosed that position, such reliance may be 
misplaced. 
B. CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS, CLASSIFICATION, AND VOTING 
When a debtor is constructing a plan of reorganization, classification 
rules require that claimants cannot be classified together, unless their 
interests are substantially similar.94 The use of credit default swaps and 
other default insurance to enhance the liquidity of claims against the debtor 
so that they can be sold may have the effect of distorting the classification 
schemes constructed by a debtor. A creditor who appears to hold an 
unsecured claim may, by virtue of purchasing insurance or a swap, actually 
have an entirely different economic interest from the other creditors holding 
similar claims.95 Here, liquidity, or liquidity enhancement, can undercut the 
ability of a debtor to negotiate a confirmable plan with creditors. 
C. BEYOND HOLDER IN DUE COURSE 
Perhaps the most remarkable example of liquidity enhancement at the 
expense of reorganization policy happened in the Enron equitable 
subordination case.96 Prior to Enron filing for bankruptcy, Citibank was 
heavily involved in putting together Enron’s structured finance vehicles.97 
Many of these financings were later found to be fraudulent.98 As a sponsor 
for these deals, Citibank ended up holding a substantial number of claims 
against Enron.99  Citibank feared that its claims against Enron might be 
equitably subordinated, so it sold its Enron claims to other banks.100 These 
banks knew that Enron had filed for bankruptcy, and they also knew of 
Citibank’s subordination risk.101 Indeed, as part of the deal to purchase 
Citibank’s Enron claims, the purchasers insisted that Citibank indemnify 
them against that risk.102 
Sure enough, when the issue was joined, Judge Gonzales subordinated 
Citibank’s claims. 103  This then raised the question of whether the 
subordination of Citibank applied to the claims or whether the purchasers 
took free of the estate’s “subordination” claim against Citibank.104 Stripped 
to its bare essentials, the purchaser sought to be given the same treatment as 
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a holder in due course. The bankruptcy court would have none of this and 
concluded that the subordination of Citibank ran with the claim and 
extended to the purchasers.105 
The response of the bond marketing industry was swift and forceful. 
They argued that this opinion endangered the market for distressed debt.106 
If a bond purchaser had to worry that its claim might later be subordinated, 
this would undercut the liquidity of the corporation’s debt not just after 
bankruptcy, but before. This fear of harming the liquidity of corporate debt 
caused the District Court for the Southern District of New York, on appeal, 
to reverse the bankruptcy court and hold that an assignment of a claim did 
not carry with it the estate’s subordination.107 
While there is no doubt that the purchasers of Citibank’s Enron claims 
did not qualify as holders in due course, both because the claims were not 
negotiable instruments and because the purchasers had notice of possible 
defenses, the court accorded them holder in due course like treatment.108 In 
short, the exigencies of claim liquidity trumped the bankruptcy policies 
associated with claims subordination. 
CONCLUSION: CHAPTER 11 AS LIQUIDITY ENHANCEMENT  
Three main points emerge from this discussion. First, doctrines that 
enhance liquidity may have costs. Information flows may be disrupted, 
incentives may be altered, and coordination problems may be created. 
Second, liquidity enhancement provides considerable benefits to the holders 
of liquidity enhanced debt. Third, and in conclusion, in seeking the benefits 
of liquidity, the costs of liquidity enhancement should not be overlooked. 
Traditionally, liquidity enhancement has been used with great care. Only 
certain sellers, whose exposure to market discipline made it unlikely that 
they would abuse the power, had the ability to transfer rights to a buyer in 
the ordinary course. Negotiable instruments hemmed in the status of holder 
in due course with formal requirements that put parties on notice of what 
they were doing when they created such an instrument and required certain 
conditions of the purchaser before according them special protection. 
Modern advocates of liquidity appear to not care about the nature of the 
transaction or the holder of the claim. Neither do they consider the costs 
that might be incurred by granting protection. Indeed, whenever there is 
discussion of possibly curtailing the liquidity of claims after bankruptcy, the 
argument is that this effect would not be limited to the claims post-
bankruptcy; it would also limit liquidity pre-bankruptcy.109 This may be true, 
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but it may not be relevant. On one level, Chapter 11 is a liquidity enhancing 
device all by itself. In the absence of Chapter 11, claims trading would stop 
with the declaration of bankruptcy or, at the most, upon the liquidation of 
assets. Bankruptcy would be a realization event. The existence of Chapter 
11 and post-bankruptcy trading prevent the filing of a petition itself from 
operating as a realization event, from fixing the value of the claim. The 
claims continue to carry with them the value of a possible reorganization, 
and hence, increased value. To the extent that the possibility of a 
reorganization is actually liquidity enhancing, it stands to reason that 
liquidity regulation, or even limitation in the interest of bankruptcy 
reorganization, would not result in a deprivation of some inherent value 
held by the owner of the claim. When considering liquidity enhancement, it 
is appropriate, and indeed essential, to consider the costs that such 
enhancement might have for a debtor seeking to reorganize. 
 
